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A Descendible Right of Publicity: Has the Time
Finally Come for a National Standard?
"Listen, lad, you're going to walk in my shoes now. Don't... let anybody
hurt us or our widows."1
-Stan Laurel
"Dead Men Don't Bite."2
-Robert Lewis Stevenson
I. INTRODUCTION
Fame is a double-edged sword. One side cuts in a manner that can
add great financial value to a celebrity's marketability and even the
commercial value of their name and likeness. The other side re-
quires long hours of hard work and determination along with the dis-
cipline that is required to maintain an achieved level of status.
However, when a famous person dies, his fame, wealth, name, like-
ness and, in effect, his hard work and determination, are subject to
numerous standards of the assignability and descendibility of some-
thing called "publicity."
In 1980, the Sixth Circuit in Memphis Development Foundation v.
Factors Etc., Inc.3 stated that recognizing a descendible right of pub-
licity would not "enlarge the stock or quality of the goods, services,
artistic creativity, information, invention or entertainment avail-
able.' 4 Yet, the posthumous disposition of the publicity of that case's
subject, Elvis Presley, refutes this argument. Upon Presley's death
in 1977, the Presley estate was valued at a mere $4.9 million.5 The
expenses required to maintain the estate would ultimately have ex-
1. Kleinfield, Publicity Rights of Stars: The Living, and the Dead, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 22, 1981, § 3, at 9, col. 1. Stan Laurel made this statement from his deathbed to
Larry Harmon. Mr. Harmon, who owned the licensing rights of Stan Laurel and Oli-
ver Hardy, along with the celebrities' widows, later prevailed in a suit against Hal
Roach Studios on a descendible right of publicity theory. See infra, notes 17, 18, 35-50
and accompanying text.
2. R. STEVENSON, TREAsURE IsLAND 87 (spec. ed. 1941).
3. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). See also infra notes 4,
11, 139-153 and accompanying text.
4. Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 960.
5. Hilburn, Eternal Revenue; Elvis' Millions Were Disappearing When Priscilla
Presley Took Charge and Rebuilt the King's Fortune, L.A. Times, June 11, 1989, (maga-
zine), at 10.
hausted the estate's holdings by 1993, the year Presley's sole heir,
Lisa Marie Presley, would inherit the estate.6 Before June 1989,
under the guidance and business savvy of the late entertainer's ex-
wife/co-executor, Priscilla Presley, and co-executors Joseph Hanks
and the National Bank of Commerce in Memphis, and a four-man
management team, Presley's estate had risen to over seventy-five
million dollars with an estimated fifteen million dollars in annual
gross income.7
More recently, the estate of Marilyn Monroe has become an issue.
Monroe left one quarter of her publicity residuals to her psychother-
apist, Marianne Kris.8 The remainder was left to her famed acting
coach, Lee Strasberg.9 Because both legatees have since died, the
ownership and control of Monroe's publicity rights were in question
some twenty-seven years after Monroe's death.10 The disputes be-
tween the Kris estate and the Strasberg estate concerning the licens-
ing of Monroe's image, and the Presley estate, demonstrate how
important the "stock or quality of the goods, services, artistic creativ-
ity, information, invention or entertainment available""- actually are
6. Id- The probate court decided that Lisa Marie Presley will inherit the estate
in 1998 rather than in 1993, in order to keep the estate under the successful guidance
of the co-executors and management team who rejuvenated the estate. Id
7. Ia Adding another facet to her duties, Priscilla Presley serves as an executive
producer, a position that holds the highest level of control, for a new television series
documenting the beginning of Presley's career between the years of 1954-1958, which
debuted in February, 1990. Daily Variety, Dec. 21, 1989, at 3, col. 4. This "highly unu-
sual arrangement," necessary to secure the publicity rights from Presley's estate, gives
Ms. Presley "'full' veto power over creative decisions." I&i
8. Anderson, Marilyn's Money: Heirs Wrangle for Control of Licensing
Monroe's Image, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1989, at 22.
9. I&
10. Id Marianne Kris died in 1980 leaving her interest in the Monroe publicity
rights to the Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic; Lee Strasberg died in 1982 leaving his
portion of the interest in the Monroe publicity rights to his wife Anna. Id The dis-
pute concerned two issues with regard to the Kris estate. First, whether Kris had
more than a life estate to the publicity rights, and second, if so, whether the clinic,
renamed the Anna Freud Centre for the Psychoanalytic Study and Treatment of Chil-
dren was, in fact, the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic which was named as legatee in
Kris' will. Id. Regarding the Strasberg estate, Mrs. Strasberg, was named in the
spring of 1989 as Monroe's administratrix. Prior to her appointment as administratrix,
Mrs. Strasberg had maintained tight control over the licensing rights through the ex-
ercise of a veto power which she held pursuant to an agreement with the Anna Freud
Centre. Id, This agreement provided that both Mrs. Strasberg and the Anna Freud
Centre could veto licensing proposals. Id In opposition to Mrs. Strasberg's motion for
appointment as administratrix, the Anna Freud Centre argued that the Monroe estate
had lost many valuable licensing contracts because Mrs. Strasberg had been too cau-
tious or inactive in co-managing the estate. Id Hearings concerning the residual pub-
licity rights were set to resume in the fall of 1989. Id On Monday, March 12, 1990, a
New York court ordered that the Anna Freud Centre was entitled to one-fourth of
Monroe's estate, which represented Kris' interest. Daily Variety, Mar. 13, 1990, at 20,
col. 5.
11. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959-60, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980). See supra note 4 and ifra notes 139-153 and accompanying text.
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to the heirs and legatees of a famous individual.
This comment discusses six major areas concerning the descendible
right of publicity as it stands today. Part II traces the development of
the common law right of publicity as well as its statutory develop-
ment in eleven states which acknowledge and protect a right of pub-
licity. In Part III, the descendible right of publicity is examined
through seminal case law, emphasizing the diversity of decisions con-
cerning the right of publicity. Part IV analyzes several of the ex-
isting state statutes and their differences. Part V explores the
resulting conflict between the first and fifth amendments of the Con-
stitution in right of publicity cases. Part VI advocates and summa-
rizes the need for a national statute to protect an individual's right of
publicity.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity was first recognized in 1953 in the seminal
decision of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.12
involving a contractual dispute concerning a number of baseball play-
ers who had sold the "exclusive" rights to their names and likenesses
to more than one baseball card company.13 The court recognized that
a person "has a right in the publicity value of his photograph" and
that "this right might be called a 'right to publicity.' "14 This right is
defined as a "reaction of the public to [a person's] name and likeness,
which may be fortuitous or which may be managed or planned, and
endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commer-
Interestingly, three years later, the Sixth Circuit took a divergent view of the right of
publicity for the living from that taken in Memphis Dev. Found, in a case surrounding
Johnny Carson and portable toilets. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). The court stated that:
First, "the right of publicity vindicates the economic interests of celebrities,
enabling those whose achievements have imbued their identities with pecuni-
ary value to profit from their fame."... Second, the right of publicity fosters
"the production of intellectual and creative works by providing the financial
incentive for individuals to expend the time and resources necessary to pro-
duce them.... . Third, "[t]he right of publicity serves both individual and socie-
tal interests by preventing what our legal tradition regards as wrongful
conduct: unjust enrichment and deceptive trade practices."
ICE at 838 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28
BuLL. COPYRIGHT SOC. 111, 116-22 (1980)) (emphasis added).
12. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
13. Id. at 867.
14. Id. at 868.
cially exploitable opportunities."15 While the Haelan court did not
specifically label the right of publicity a property right, the court
stated that such a label is "immaterial... as... the tag 'property'
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pe-
cuniary worth."16 However, because no national consensus or federal
statute developed following the Haelan decision, each state or district
court which subsequently addressed this issue has determined its
own view of the right.
In reaching its decision, each state or district court has decided first
whether a right of publicity actually exists, 17 and if so, whether that
right is assignable or descendible.1s However, "much confusion is
generated by the notion that the right of publicity emanates from the
classic right of privacy."' 9 Dean William Prosser proclaimed that a
remedy for the appropriation of a person's name. or likeness for com-
mercial purposes emerges- from the .personal right of priva~y.20
Under this analysis, the right of publicity is a personal right and ex-
tinguishes upon the death of the person.2 ' The result is that courts
differ in their approach to this issue: some courts do not recognize
any right of publicity, some courts use the Prosser analysis and view
15. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 329 (1979).
16. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
17. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (indi-
vidual's commercial right in name and likeness is distinct from his right of privacy);
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (although never explicitly recognized by New York State courts, the district
court agreed with other federal courts that New York nevertheless recognizes a right
of publicity), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317. 320 (2d Cir. 1982) (the court of appeals reversed on
grounds that California law, not New York law, applied and that under California law,
a right of publicity exists); Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620,
622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (App. Div. 1977) (right of proprietary interest in publicity
unequivocally exists).
18. See Reeve v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (com-
plaint dismissed with prejudice as the right of publicity is not descendible under Ohio
common law), aff'd per curiam, 765 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1985) (right of publicity seen
as part of the invasion of privacy and, therefore, extinguished at death); Price, 400 F.
Supp. at 843-46 (right of publicity is assignable and descendible); Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d
at 621-22, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (the right to publicity, i.e., the property right in one's
name, photograph and image, is not inhibited by limitations placed on the right of pri-
vacy; the right of privacy is not assignable nor descendible); Groucho Marx Produc-
tions, Inc., 689 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1982) (right of publicity is not descendible in
California).
19. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 843.
20. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAuF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960). Prosser wrote that the per-
sonal right of privacy included protection against four invasions: (1) "[i]ntrusion upon
the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs"; (2) "[p]ublic disclosure
of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff"; (3) "[p]ublicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye"; and (4) "[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Id- (emphasis added).
21. D. Beiderman, R. Berry, E. Pierson, M. Silfen, & J. Glasser, LAW AND BusI-
NESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDusTRIES 557 (1987) [hereinafter LAw AND
ENTERTAINMENT].
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it as an element of the personal right of privacy, and some courts sep-
arate the right of publicity from the right of privacy,22 viewing it as a
property interest.23
Upon establishing a proprietary right of publicity, even though
most states have then agreed that such a right is descendible,24 many
states require that a finding of descendibility requires that the celeb-
rity must have exploited his name or likeness in some manner during
his lifetime. Some courts even provide that the right to publicity de-
scends only to the extent and manner in which the celebrity ex-
ploited his name and likeness during his lifetime.25 In effect, a
celebrity such as Bette Midler who does no commercial endorse-
ments26 has a great concern as to how her publicity right will be
22. Id at 558.
23. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
24. Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
25. See, eg., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
[hereinafter Factors 1], aff'd, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Factors 11] (right
of publicity descendible because it was exploited during lifetime), cert denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979). See infra notes 51-54, 70, 80, 176-177 and accompanying text; Hicks v. Casa-
blanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (those seeking to establish a descendi-
ble right of publicity must prove that the celebrity exploited his name and likeness in
such a manner that demonstrated that he was aware of its value). See infra notes 51-
59 and accompanying text; Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Products, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (no descendible
right of publicity since King did not exploit name and likeness commercially during
his lifetime), rev'd per curiam, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (on grounds that under
Georgia law, King need not have commercially exploited his right to publicity during
his lifetime in order for the right of publicity to be descendible). See infra notes 58,
157-158 and accompanying text; Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and Night Co.,
Inc., 523 F. Supp. 465, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (right of publicity is descendible in New
York provided person exploited the right during lifetime); Lugosi v. Universal Pic-
tures, 25 Cal. 3d 313, 818-20, 603 P.2d 425, 428-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326-27 (1979) (right
of publicity must be exercised during life and is only descendible as to those specific
items and products endorsed during life). See infra notes 87-89; Groucho Marx Pro-
ductions, Inc., 689 F.2d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 1982) (right of publicity in California is either
not descendible or descendible only for those items which were vehicles of exploitation
during life). See infra notes 86-91.
26. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1988). After learning
that Midler did not do commercial endorsements, Ford Motor Company's advertising
agency, Young & Rubicam, used a sound-alike voice imitating Midler's rendition of
'"Do You Want to Dance?" in a television commercial. Because she was still living, the
California right to publicity statute, which protects the deceased person only, did not
apply. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(a) (West Supp. 1989). However, because the statute pro-
tects a deceased person's voice as a property right, and because by analogy the common
law rights are also property rights, the court cited the statute to support its holding.
Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. The court held that because Ford's advertising agency had at-
tempted to hire Midler by contacting her agent, and when they were unable to secure
her services employed one of Midler's back-up singers to imitate Midler, they had, in
effect, appropriated Midler's distinctive voice for commercial purposes. Id The court,
viewed on a national level once she dies. Although Midler won her
case in California concerning the appropriation of her voice for an
automobile commercial, 27 upon her death her rights may not be as
secure in those states which would provide protection only for public-
ity rights exploited during her lifetime.28
As more states have become concerned with the lack of legislative
protection for a descendible right of publicity, eight states have
adopted statutes which specifically protect these rights.29 In New
York, the state senate and assembly have considered such a bill for
the past two years.3 0 As with similar state statutes, deceased celebri-
ties' heirs have played a major role in the proposed New York legisla-
tion.31 On February 15, 1988, celebrity heirs, such as John Wayne's
son, Michael Wayne, W.C. Fields' grandson, Everett Field, and Clark
Gable's son, John Clark Gable, testified on behalf of the proposed
legislation.32 A similar hearing was held again on May 15, 1989, in
conjunction with the resubmission of the proposed bill.s3 Although
the bill failed in both attempts due to concerns of an undue burden
on first amendment rights, the proponents, New York State Senator
Emanuel R. Gold and New York State Assemblyman Alan G. Havesi,
plan to continue to support the bill in order to secure the celebrities'
right of publicity in New York.3 4
however, added that this holding did not render every commercial imitation as actiona-
ble. Id.
27. Id- Recently, on remand, Ford Motor Company, an original defendant, was
dismissed because of insufficient evidence. Daily Variety, Oct. 31, 1989, at 1, col. 4. A
federal jury awarded Midler $400,000 in damages against the advertising agency in-
volved. Id-
28. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
29. Gordon & Honig, The Celebrity Rights Act, THE ENT. AND SPORTs LAw, Sum-
mer-Fall 1988, at 2. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1)(c) (West 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West
1983 & Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (1988); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 26.001-26.015 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Supp. 1989).
Other states have statutorially recognized a publicity right, but have not included de-
scendible rights within their statutes. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A
(West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-2 to 45-3-6 (1988).
30. Gordon & Honig, supra note 28, at 1.
31. W.C. Fields' grandson, Everett Field, assisted in drafting the California Stat-
ute. Id- Priscilla Presley and the Presley estate management team were instrumental
in securing legislation in Tennessee. Hilburn, supra note 5.
32. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 1.
33. Telephone interview with John J. McPadden, Legislative Director for New
York State Senator Emanuel R. Gold, Deputy Minority Leader (October 13, 1989).
34. Id
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III. THE COMMON LAW DESCENDIBLE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE
LACK OF NATIONAL CONSISTENCY
A. Right of Publicity Claims
In the thirty-six years since the Haelan decision, the common law
right of publicity has been subjected to numerous interpretations.
The resulting standards have imposed an inconsistent basis of relief
for those whose predecessors' names and likenesses have been appro-
priated. New York and federal district courts have been particularly
vulnerable to this vacillation in the law.
Following Haelan, the ownership of the publicity rights of comedi-
ans Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy was contested.3 5 Laurel Hardy's
widow Lucille Hardy Price, and Laurel and Hardy Feature Produc-
tions36 entered into an agreement with Larry Harmon on March 21,
1961, "which granted Harmon the right to acquire in perpetuity the
exclusive right to utilize and merchandise the names, likenesses,
characters and characterizations of Laurel and Hardy."37 Hal Roach
Studios (Roach) held the copyrights to all "Laurel and Hardy"
films 38 and believed that, under various contracts between the come-
dians and the studio, Roach controlled the publicity and merchandis-
ing rights.39 Price, Harmon, and Ida K. Laurel sued Roach for
misappropriation of the comedians' publicity rights in federal district
court in New York.40 Given no federal statute, this case illustrated
the analysis that the courts must use.41
Although the language of the early movie contracts did purport to
grant Roach the exclusive publicity rights,42 the court held that
35. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. Id at 838 n.2. This was a corporation formed in 1939 that actually employed
the two comedians to produce motion pictures.
37. IdE at 838 (emphasis added).
38. Id
39. Id On January 21, 1971, Roach sold the same exclusive rights purported to be
owned by Harmon to Richard Feiner & Company, which conveyed the international
rights to the Overseas Programming Companies, Ltd. I&
40. Id at 838-39.
41. See supm notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
42. An example of one of these provisions states that:
The second party [Hardy] expressly gives and grants to the first party [Roach]
the sole and exclusive right to photograph any and all of his acts, poses, plays,
and appearances of any and all kinds, and the right to record and/or
reproduce his voice and all instrumental and/or musical and/or other sound
effects of any and all kinds during the term hereof, and to produce or
reproduce the same by any method whether now known or not, and the first
party shall have the exclusive and complete control, right, title and property
and the right of copyright in and to all the foregoing things, and any and all
"[t]hese provisions . . .are always expressly limited to the 'term' of
the contract."43 Thus, the completion of these contracts terminated
Roach's control of the comedians' names and likenesses. The court
also found that another contract provision in which Laurel and
Hardy had retained their right to make commercial endorsements
during the term of the movie contracts was essential in determining
that neither party had intended to relinquish control of their public-
ity rights beyond the term of the contracts."
With the contract issues decided, the court addressed-the-conte-
tion that the comedians' names and likenesses were public domain.
Remaining consistent with Haelan, the court distinguished the com-
mon law right of publicity from the statutorially protected right-of
privacy 45 and concluded that the right of publicity was a distinct
property right under New York common law.46 The next question
the court answered was "whether the right of publicity terminates
upon the death of the individual or whether it is descendible."47 This
case actually combined the assignability and descendibility of the
right since Stan Laurel was alive when the contract with Harmon
was formed.48 Although the court recognized that the-statutory right
of privacy terminated upon death, the court emphasized the "purely
commercial nature of the protected right... [of publicity and saw] no
logical reason to terminate this right upon death of the person pro-
tected."49 On the basis of this decision and shortly thereafter, Har-
mon was able to require a windshield-wiper blade company to
purchase a licensing agreement before mounting its advertising cam-
paign featuring the Laurel and Hardy characters.5 0
By 1978, federal interpretation of common law in New York sug-
gested an additional element in proving the prima facie case of appro-
priation of a deceased person's name or likeness. A plaintiff who
claims that he is the holder of another's right to control the usage of
that other person's name or likeness for commercial purposes must
parts thereof, as well as in and to the name of the second party for any of
such purposes during the term hereof and perpetually in connection with all
productions in which the second party appears under the provisions hereof, as
fully and completely and to all intents and purposes, as the second party could
or would have enjoyed the same in the absence of this agreement.
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 840 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.).
43. Id at 841.
44. Id.
45. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989). Under these
sections it is a misdemeanor (§ 50) and a tort (§ 51) to use a living person's "name, por-
trait or picture ... for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade... without having
first obtained" that person's written consent. Id.
46. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 843-44.
47. Id at 844 (footnotes omitted).
48. Id, at 844 n.8.
49. Id. at 844.
50. Klienfield, supra note 1, at 9, col. 1.
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prove that the person exploited that right during his lifetime. 51 On
the heels of this suggested element, the court in Hicks v. Casablanca
Records 2 further refined the additional element by defining '-ex:
ploited."_The court explained that "a party claiming the right [of
publicity] must establish that the decedent acted in such a way as to
evidence his or her own recognition of the extrinsic commercial value
of his or her name or likeness, and manifested that recognition in
some overt manner."5 3 The court provided examples such as having
made an assignment of the right or posing for bubble gum cards, as in
Haelan, which would demonstrate that the decedent had made an
overt act during his lifetime.54
Hicks concerned the famed mystery novelist Agatha Christie.
Christie's heir and assignees attempted to stop the distribution of a
film and a book which depicted her publicized mysterious eleven-day
disappearance in 1926.55 The book and movie fictionalized Christie's
disappearance and included scenes which portrayed her in an unfa-
vorable light as being mentally unstable and plotting the murder of
her husband's mistress.56 In its analysis, the court acknowledged that
Christie had exploited her name to the point that it was "almost sy-
nonymous with mystery novels." 57 Although the defendants, the
book and movie companies, argued that the type of exploitation re-
quired for a descendible right of publicity must be "exercised... in-
dependently of that thing for which the grantor was known,"58 the
51. Factors II, 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). See
supra note 25 and infra notes 87-92, 135, 176-177 and accompanying text. The Factors
I court noted that because Elvis Presley had exploited his publicity right during his
life, the court "need not . .. decide whether the right would survive the death of a
celebrity if not exploited during the celebrity's life." Factors II, 579 F.2d at 222 n.11.
52. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
53. Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 428-29. Rosalind Christie Hicks, the sole heir to the rights of Agatha
Christie's work, and the assignees, Agatha Christie, Ltd. and William Collins Sons &
Co., Ltd., were the plaintiffs in the action. The heir and assigns, in their quest to en-
join the distribution of the film and the book, were unable to use theories such as defa-
mation and the right to privacy because these are personal rights which terminate
with death. Id. at 429.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 428.
58. Id. at 429 n.6. Even Martin Luther King, Jr. was not safe from such a fate.
Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products,
Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd per curiam, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983)
[hereinafter King]. American Heritage sought endorsements from the Center concern-
ing the production and sales of a plastic bust of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. King, 508
F. Supp. at 856. Regardless of the fact that the Center declined as to any kind of par-
court found that Christie had sufficiently exploited her name under
their interpretation for the heir and assignees to receive protection
for her right of publicity.59
Price and Hicks demonstrate the analysis a court must undertake
in resolving these issues.6 0 The focus now turns to some of the incon-
sistencies that arise when federal courts interpret other states' laws
or states begin to develop their own common law concerning the
right of publicity.
In another high-profile case, Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v.
Day and Night Co., Inc.,61 a New York federal district court imple-
mented the same analysis as previously described and found that the
Marx Brothers' right of publicity was protected after their deaths.62
The case centered around the musical comedy A Day in Hollywood/A
Night in the Ukraine.6 3 During the second act of the musical, three
characters take the stage as Groucho, Harpo and Chico Marx, other-
wise known as the Marx Brothers. Although the play makes no ref-
erence to the Marxes by name, the script requires "three principle
performers to reproduce the appearance and comedy style made
memorable by Groucho, Chico, and Harpo."64
The plaintiffs in this case maintained that they held the publicity
rights of the Marxes for various reasons. Groucho Marx Productions,
ticipation, American Heritage commenced producing and marketing the unauthorized
plastic busts. Id. at 856-57.
When the Center, King's administratrix Coretta Scott King, and Motown Records
(Motown owned the copyright to certain speeches of which commemorative copies
were also being sold) brought suit, a district court in Georgia took notice that, although
Georgia common law recognized a right of publicity, id. at 862, "King did not exploit
his public personality to his commercial advantage by endorsing products or selling
merchandise bearing his name or image" during his lifetime. Id. at 865. The issue of
descendibility was one of first impression in Georgia, and this court held that without
similar inter vivos exploitation it would not find a descendible right of publicity. Id.
The Center and estate failed in acquiring an injunction preventing the manufacture
and sale of the busts. Id.
Fortunately, the Eleventh Circuit in King, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983), stated un-
equivocally, via an opinion by the Supreme Court of Georgia in answer to certified
questions from the court of appeals, that Georgia common law recognized the right of
publicity, id. at 677-80; that the right is assignable during life and survives the assignor
upon death, id. at 680-82; and that the decedent need not exploit or commercialize his
name or likeness during his lifetime to preserve the descendibility of the right. Id. at
682-83.
59. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y.). Although the
court recognized the assignable right of publicity, and that Christie had sufficiently ex-
ploited her name, the court ruled that the film and book could not be enjoined based
on first amendment considerations. Id. at 433. See infra notes 264-271 and accompany-
ing text.
60. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
61. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
62. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and Night Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485,
494 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
63. Id. at 486.
64. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., 689 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Inc. claimed that it held the rights of Julius (Groucho) Marx and Leo
(Chico) Marx through contractual agreements. 65 While he was still
living, Groucho assigned his rights to the company. Chico's widow,
Mary Marx Fusco, was assigned the rights she acquired through the
residual benefits of Chico's will.66 Plaintiff Susan Marx, Adolf
(Harpo) Marx's daughter, claimed ownership of Harpo's publicity
rights as trustee of his last will and testament.6 7
The court in Groucho Marx Productions was consistent with other
New York district courts and held that there was a common law
right of publicity in New York,68 and that the right was transfera-
ble.69 The court also agreed that in order for the right to be descend-
- ible, it must be proved that the Marxes exploited their right of
publicity during their lifetime.70 The court used the Hicks definition
-of "exploited" in its analysis.71
Rejecting the defendants' argument that the comedians' inter vivos
commercial exploitation of publicity rights needed to -be different
from that for which they were famous, the court reasoned that since
Groucho made an assignment of his name and likeness and that since
"[e]very appearance, contract and advertisement involving the Marx
Brothers signified recognition by the performers of the commercial
value of [the] unique characters they portrayed," 72 Groucho, Chico,
and Harpo Marx had sufficiently exploited their right of publicity.73
Therefore, the descendible right was protected.74 The court also re-
jected the premise that such celebrities must "tie-up" their names
and likenesses by endorsing products and establishments so as to pre-
65. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., 523 F. Supp. at 486.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. Id. at 487.
69. Id. at 488.
70. Id. at 490. The court cited Factors II, 579 F.2d 215, 222, (2d Cir. 1978), cert de-
nied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (holding that because Elvis Presley exploited his right during
his lifetime, it was descendible). See supra note 25 and infra notes 80, 176-77 and ac-
companying text.
71. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and Night Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485,
490 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See supra notes 52-54.
72. I& at 491.
73. Id. at 491-92.
74. Id. at 492. There were first amendment hurdles that the plaintiffs also had to
overcome in order to prevail. The court found that the musical was not protected by
the first amendment because it was not a biographical depiction of the Marx Brothers
nor was it a parody of the Marx Brothers. Instead, the play completely reproduced the
actions and appearances of the Marxes as they themselves would have portrayed the
roles. Id at 493. This appropriation of a person's entire act is not protected by the first
amendment. Id at 494. See infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
serve their descendible right of publicity as "wholly illogical."75
Although the Marx Brothers' case was originally decided based
upon federal interpretation of New York common law, 76 on appeal, 77
the Second Circuit took a much closer look at the question of diver-
sity which, given no federal statute on the right of publicity, was the
basis of the suit in federal court.78 Although a federal diversity suit
may be brought in the state in which all the defendants reside,79 the
court cited their recent decision in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.80
The court maintained that since the issue concerned a proprietary in-
terest, the state law which determines the existence of the person's
property interest should govern.81
Upon their deaths, all three Marx Brothers were residents of Cali-
fornia.82 Groucho Marx Productions was incorporated in Califor-
nia.83 Groucho's inter vivos assignment of his rights to Groucho
Marx Productions, Harpo's will, Chico's estate, and his widow's as-
signment of his rights to the production company, all transpired in
California and were governed by California law.84 Susan Marx, who
was a plaintiff in behalf of Harpo's estate, was also a resident of Cali-
fornia.8 5 The court stated that "[t]hough the conduct alleged to im-
pair plaintiffs' rights occurred in New York, the existence of their
rights must be determined under the law of California."8 6
75. Id. at 490-92. C. note 25 and accompanying text (this position would be accept-
able to Bette Midler's potential heirs as she does not do commercial endorsements).
76. Id. at 487. The court explained that New York state courts had not explicitly
recognized a common law right of publicity. Id. The determination that New York did
recognize such a right was a conclusion drawn by federal district courts sitting in New
York. Id.
77. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 319-20, Although the plaintiffs had originally brought a federal question
cause of action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976), the case in
the lower court was decided upon the common law right of publicity. Id. at 319.
Therefore, the federal jurisdiction of the case rested entirely on diversity. 1d
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1983). "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only
on diversity of citizenship may . .. be brought only in the judicial district where all
plaintiffs or all defendants reside .... " Id.
80. 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) [hereinafter Factors I1] rev'd, 652 F.2d 278
(2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Factors IV], cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). See ifa
notes 105, 145, 184-92 and accompanying text.
81. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., 689 F.2d at 319-20 (citing Factors IV, 652 F.2d
at 281). In Factors IV, the court concluded that because Elvis Presley was domiciled in
Tennessee when he died, the company to which Presley had assigned his right of pub-
licity when he was alive was incorporated in Tennessee, the company to which the
rights were ultimately assigned was incorporated in Tennessee, and the contracts in
the above assignments were constructed under Tennessee law, the court should look to
Tennessee law to determine whether there was a valid property right transferred at
all. Factors IV, 652 F.2d at 281.
82. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., 689 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1982).
83. Id,
84. Id,
85. Id.
86. Id.
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In applying California law, the court did not find a clear answer.
The Second Circuit identified three possible views as to California's
common law of the descendible right of publicity: California recog-
nizes no descendible right;8 7 California recognizes a descendible right
which protects against the appropriation of a name or likeness from
posthumous endorsements of the same nature as were made during
life;88 or, California recognizes a descendible right of publicity which
protects against any appropriation of name or likeness.8 9 Expressly
rejecting the third alternative,90 the court decided that under Califor-
ia law, the defendant-appellants, Day and Night Company, could
87. Id. at 321. In its analysis of the first view, the court used Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Productions, 73 Cal. App. 3d 436, 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977) (opinion deleted
from 73 Cal. App. 3d, vacated, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., 689 F.2d at 320. In Guglielmi, Rudolf Valentino's
nephew and legal heir sued Spelling-Goldberg Productions for the unauthorized use of
his uncle's name and likeness to solicit commercial sponsorship for a fictional televi-
sion depiction of Valentino's life. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 862-63, 603 P.2d at 455-56,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55. The Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc, reempha-
sized that, based on Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323 (1979), which they had decided two days earlier, a right of publicity exists
but is terminated at death. Therefore, Valentino's right of publicity was not descendi-
ble. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353. Although the
court in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. found this case conclusive as to California
law, they continued to analyze Lugosi in order to investigate all avenues of interpreta-
tion. Groucho Marx Production, Inc., 689 F.2d at 320.
88. Id. at 321. The court used Lugosi for this analysis. Id. at 320-22. Bela Lugosi,
famous for his leading role in Dracula, had signed an agreement in his 1930 contract
for the film, giving Universal Pictures the right to use his name, likeness, and voice as
"Count Dracula" "in connection with the advertising and exploitation of the said pho-
toplay." Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 816 n.2, 603 P.2d at 426 n.2, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 n.2 (em-
phasis added). Lugosi died in 1956 and Universal continued to use Lugosi's likeness for
merchandise. Id. at 817, 603 P.2d at 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325. Lugosi's wife and son
sued Universal for this continued appropriation of Lugosi's likeness. Although the Lu-
gosi court held that any right of publicity must be exercised during one's lifetime, id.
at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329, it made reference to a hypothetical situa-
tion where Lugosi's heirs might have been protected as to a specific item or product
had Lugosi established a business and exploited his name and likeness in connection
with that item or product during his life. Id. at 819-20, 603 P.2d at 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
327. The Second Circuit stated that "[a]t most, California would recognize a descendi-
ble right of publicity that would have enabled the heirs to prevent others from using
Lugosi's name and likeness on T-shirts or any other product he had promoted during
his life." Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., 689 F.2d at 321-22.
89. Id. at 321. The New York court then specifically rejected this broad scope of
the descendible right of publicity under California law. Id. at 321-22. The Lugosi court
specifically stated that even if Lugosi had exploited some product or item during his
lifetime, and assuming that the California courts recognized such a descendible public-
ity right as to that product or item, the heirs would still not have "the right to exploit
their predecessor's name and likeness to commercial situations he left unexploited."
Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 823-24, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
90. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
not be liable for infringing upon the Marx Brothers' right of public-
ity.9 1 The court reasoned that even with the slightly broader inter-
pretation espoused in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, the Marx
plaintiff-appellees' claim failed because the Marx Brothers did not
have "connection[s] with particular commercial situations-products
and services ... [which would be recognized in California] as a de-
scendible right of publicity that protects against an original play us-
ing... [the celebrities'] likeness[es] and comedic style."9 2
Although the above discussion demonstrates that federal district
and appellate courts in New York have ruled on the issue of the de-
scendible right of publicity, these courts, bound to follow state sub-
stantive law in a diversity suit,93 did not have an actual state decision
on the issue to use as a guide for the federal decisions. New York
state courts did not actually address the issue of a descendible right
of publicity until Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence.9 4
Southeast Bank was the representative of the estate of playwright
Thomas "Tennessee" Williams.9 5 Williams was known for maintain-
ing exclusive control over the production of his works and the use of
his name.9 6 Williams would not allow his name to be associated with
anything over which he did not have direct control or where he did
not have the ability to ascertain the use of his name based on an-
other's control.9 7 The defendant, Jarick Productions, owned a thea-
tre in New York City which its principals, Jack and Richard
Lawrence, wished to renovate and rename the "Tennessee Williams."
Southeast Bank made unsuccessful attempts to preclude the use of
Williams' name by contacting the Lawrences to alert them that the
estate had not consented to such usage of Williams' name.9 8 Ignoring
91. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., 689 F.2d at 323.
92. Id. (footnote omitted). The plaintiff-appellees pointed out to the court that all
three of the Brothers promoted various products during their lives. Id. at n.7. How-
ever, these products ranged from Plymouth automobiles to Smirnoff vodka. Id. As
the products had nothing to do with a play or musical, they did not allow the plaintiff-
appellee to protect the likenesses of the Marx Brothers from use in a play.
93. Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
94. 104 A.D.2d 213, 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (1984), rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 911, 489
N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985). ("Can the representative of the estate of a de-
ceased public figure assert the right of publicity after his death? This novel issue is
presented to us on this appeal.")
Although the court in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Barnbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977) alluded to a descendible right of publicity, the court never clearly
formulated a statement on the issue. "[Wihile a cause of action under the Civil Rights
Law is not assignable during one's lifetime and terminates at death, the right of public-
ity, i.e., the property right in one's name, photograph and image is under no such inhi-
bition." Id. at 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
95. Southeast Bank, N.A., 104 A.D.2d at 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
96. Id. at 214, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 219. Williams had actually made provisions in his
will that upon his death, his works should not be altered. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 215, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 220. The Lawrences maintained that the use of Wil-
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Southeast Bank's notice, the Lawrences continued renovation, er-
ected a marquee with Williams' name, planned rehearsals, and began
to mount an advertising campaign for the theatre's opening. South-
east subsequently brought suit to enjoin the production company
from using Williams' name for the theatre based upon the right of
publicity99 and for what the court phrased as Southeast Bank's in-
ability "to ensure that the quality of the productions presented there
would meet the standard set by 'Tennessee Williams.' "100
In its analysis, the court cited the New York case, Lombardo v.
Doyle, which stated "that 'there is no question but that a celebrity
has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality.' "101
Regarding inter vivos exploitation to protect the descendibility of the
right, the court held that although such exploitation is not required
under New York state law,102 Williams had exploited his name dur-
ing his lifetime by writing an autobiography and by associating him-
self with various support groups and lending his name to their
causes.
103
The court concluded that Williams' right of publicity did survive
his death and, as his representative, Southeast Bank was awarded an
injunction against the defendant's use of Williams' name. 0 4 Unfortu-
nately, this case was later reversed by the Court of Appeals in New
York based upon choice of law principles similar to those seen in
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. and Factors IV.105
liams' name was "'to honor the memory and contributions of one of America's great-
est playwrights."' Id However, the court, summarizing both its and Southeast's point
of view, stated that the purpose was for "deriving financial benefit from the use of
such an illustrious name." Id. at 220, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 223. The court added that thea-
tres such as the "Helen Hayes" and the "Eugene O'Neil" were only named after per-
mission was granted from their namesakes. Id.
99. Id. at 215-16, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
100. 1& at 215, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
101. Id. at 216, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (quoting Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Burnbach,
Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1971)). See supra notes 17, 18 and 94.
102. Southeast Bank, N.A., 104 A.D.2d at 218-219, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 222 (quoting Price
v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (1975)), rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 911, 489
N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985). See supra note 35. Contra, Factors Etc., Inc. v Pro
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978) (Second Circuit held that New York state
law requires exploitation during lifetime); see supra notes 25 and 70 and infra notes
176-77. Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (district court in New York held that descendibility requires exploitation during
lifetime); see supra notes 25 and 70.
103. Southeast Bank, NA., 104 A.D.2d at 218, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
104. Id. at 220, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
105. See supra note 81. The resulting opinion of Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence,
66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985) provided yet another example of
the inconsistencies in this field of the law based upon the equivocal state laws, com-
Just one week after the lower court decision in Southeast Bank al-
lowing a descendible right of publicity, and after numerous previ-
ously discussed federal court decisions applying New York state law
dating back to 1953 with Haelan, New York's highest state court
ruled that the state did not recognize a proprietary right of publicity
separate from the personal rights, which are provided by New York's
Civil Rights statutes and extinguishable upon death!
In Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.,10 6 the plaintiff was a
mon or statutory, as applied to the situation at bar. The court of appeals ruled that the
lower court had failed to use the appropriate choice of law principles of New York and
Florida, Williams' domicile upon his death. Citing numerous authorities including
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., and Factors 1V, the court of appeals stated that
"questions concerning personal property rights are to be determined by reference to
the substantive law of the decedent's domicile." Southeast Bank, 66 N.Y.2d at 912, 489
N.E.2d at 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 776. The court of appeals then applied the Florida stat-
ute covering such publicity rights. The statute, which is written very narrowly, only
grants a descendible right of publicity to an inter vivos licensee and to a spouse or
child of the decedent. Id. at 912, 489 N.E.2d at 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (citing FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1988)). Because Williams had no surviving spouse or child,
and had not licensed his right of publicity during his lifetime, the right extinguished
upon death and could not now be enforced by a representative on Williams' behalf. Id.
In another decision which demonstrates rulings based on choice of law principles,
the Second Circuit, in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), off'd, 875
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), used Oregon common law to render a decision concerning ac-
tress Ginger Rogers' right of publicity. Rogers, who is "among that small elite of the
entertainment world whose identit[y] [is] readily called to mind by just . .. [her] first
namea, particularly [in] the pairing 'Ginger and Fred,'" id. at 996, brought suit in fed-
eral court seeking an injunction against the distribution of the defendants' film, "Gin-
ger and Fred." Id. at 997. The film was not a biographical depiction of the famous
dance team, but rather a fictional story of an Italian dance team who came to be
known as Italy's "Ginger and Fred." Id. Although Rogers' primary claim was based
upon § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), she also sought relief
under a right of publicity claim. Id.
Citing Southeast Bank, N.A., the court held that this claim must be determined
based upon Oregon state law, the state of Rogers' domicile. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1002.
Although no Oregon cases have directly decided the status of the right of publicity in
that state, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting, Co., 300 Or.
452, 712 P.2d 803 (1986), did make reference to the right of publicity and its distinction
from the right of privacy, thereby implicating that the right of publicity is a separate
proprietary interest. The Oregon court stated in the dictum that "[w]hen actors, ath-
letes or other performers object, not to a loss of anonymity, but to unauthorized ex-
ploitation of their valuable public identities, the remedy should reflect the wrongful
appropriation of a 'right to publicity' that has economic value to the plaintiff as well as
to the defendant, rather than damages for psychic distress at a loss of privacy.' " Id.
at 459, 712 P.2d at 812 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit cited Anderson in decid-
ing Rogers, stating that since Anderson did not resolve a right of publicity claim, the
Second Circuit would have to predict how Oregon courts would settle such a claim.
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1002 (footnote omitted).
Basing their decision on Oregon's concern for freedom of expression, the Second Cir-
cuit ruled that Rogers could not prevail on a right of publicity claim "unless the title
[of the film] was 'wholly unrelated' to the movie or was 'simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for sale of goods or services.'" Id. at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spell-
ing-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 865 n.6, 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355
n.6 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) and Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlop, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768,
769, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980)).
106. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984).
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professional model who agreed to allow his likeness to be used in a
photographic layout for a fall fashion article in New York maga-
zine. 107 One week prior to the publication of the issue in which the
layout was to be published, the defendant published a different photo
of the model taken during the same photo session for a New York
magazine regular feature article focusing on new and unusual trends
in the New York area.108 The plaintiff felt that the use of the photo
in the additional issue of the magazine was an infringement upon his
common law right of publicity.109 The caption of the unauthorized
photo contained an advertisement for the jacket.110
The court traced the development of the common law right of pub-
licity as a separate and distinct right from privacy and reasoned that
because the New York Civil Rights Law under sections 50 and 51
parallels the common-law right of privacy... [and] generally provides reme-
dies for any commercialization of the individual's personality without his con-
sent[,] . . 111 the "right of publicity" is encompassed under the Civil Rights
Law as an aspect of the right of privacy, which, as noted, is exclusively statu-
tory in this State, [and] the plaintiff cannot claim an independent common-
law right of publicity.
1 1 2
Although the Stephano court conceded in a footnote that at the
time of the decision there was no need to rule on the transferability,
assignability, or descendibility of the right of publicity,113 the court
cited the Prosser theory which defines publicity as a rudiment of the
107. Id. at 179, 474 N.E.2d at 581-82, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 221-22.
108. Id at 179-80, 474 N.E.2d 581-82, 485 N.Y.S.2d 221-22.
109. Id, The plaintiff's primary claim was an infringement upon his statutorily
protected civil rights under New York law. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
110. The plaintiff alleged that the unauthorized photo was an exploitation of his
likeness for trade or advertising without consent or payment. Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d at
179-83, 474 N.E.2d at 581-84, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 221-24. The caption read: "Yes Giorgio-
From Giorgio Armani. Based on his now classic turn on the bomber jacket, this cot-
ton-twill version with 'fun fur' collar features the same cut at a far lower price--about
$225. It'll be available in the stores next week.-Henry Post Bomber Jacket/Barney's,
Bergdorf Goodman, Bloomingdale's." Id at 179, 474 N.E.2d at 582, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
111. Id. at 183, 474 N.E.2d at 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (citing Prosser, supra note 20,
at 403 (citations omitted)).
112. Id. (footnote omitted). Upon reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals an-
alyzed the case based upon the right to privacy as expressed in sections 50 and 51 of
the New York Civil Rights Law. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64
N.Y.S.2d 174, 184, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984). The court ex-
plained that the plaintiff could offer no direct proof as to the unauthorized publication
being an advertisement rather than a newsworthy item in a regularly featured article
discussing trends in merchandise, and therefore reversed the decision and granted
summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 184-87, 474 N.E.2d at 584-87, 485 N.Y.S.2d
at 224-27.
113. Id. at 183 n.2, 474 N.E.2d at 584 n.2, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224 n.2.
right of privacy.1' 4 As previously discussed, under the Prosser analy-
sis such a right is a personal right rather than a proprietary right and
is extinguished upon death.115 Therefore, it appears that the right of
publicity is not descendible in the state of New York.116
Ohio is another state which does not recognize a descendible right
of publicity. The film Raging Bull was a biographical dramatization
of boxer Jake LaMotta. Within the first two minutes of the film,
LaMotta's character, played by Robert DeNiro, defeats the character
of J.R. Jimmy Reeves, played by Floyd Anderson. 117 Boxing records
proved that Reeves was the actual winner of the fight.118 Reeves'
widow and administratrix, Louise, brought suit in behalf of Reeves'
estate against the producers, writers, and even DeNiro and Anderson,
claiming that they had "misappropriated the name, identity, charac-
ter, ability and performance of Jimmy Reeves, thereby depriving
Reeves' estate of a property right and violating Reeves' right of pub-
licity." 19 The court went on to analyze the right of publicity in
much the same manner that has been discussed in this article.120 In
its application of Ohio substantive law, the court used the seminal
case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co.,121 where the
Ohio Supreme Court specifically noted that the right of publicity was
not a property right but rather a personal right stemming from the
right of privacy.122 The court denied Reeves' estate relief by conclud-
ing that the law in Ohio, emphatically stated in Zacchini I, recog-
nizes no descendible right of publicity.123
114. Id. at 183, 474 N.E.2d at 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
115. See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
116. S. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND "MORAL
RiGHTs" 579 (1988). The court of appeals of New York had a second opportunity to
rule upon the descendibility of the right of publicity when Southeast Bank, N.A. v.
Lawrence came before the court about one year later. As previously discussed, the
case was reversed based upon choice of law principles. See supra note 104 and accom-
panying text. However, the court, having decided that Florida law controlled the dis-
position of the case, stated that they did "not pass upon the question of whether a
common-law descendible right of publicity exists in this State [of New York]." South-
east Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d 911, 912, 489 N.E.2d 744, 745, 498 N.Y.2d 775,
777 (1985).
117. Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (N.D. Ohio 1983), off'd per
curiam, 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1985).
118. Reeves, 572 F. Supp. at 1232.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 1233-35.
121. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 226, 351 N.E.2d 454, 456 (1976) [hereinafter Zacchini 1],
rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977) [hereinafter Zacchini I].
122. Reeves, 572 F. Supp. at 1232 (citing Zacchini 1, 47 Ohio St. 2d at 226, 351 N.E.2d
at 456). The importance of this case is grounded in the constitutional issues which
arise in publicity cases. See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
123. Reeves, 572 F. Supp. at 1235.
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B. The Elvis Presley Estate
Probably the most litigious estate concerning matters of publicity
rights is that of Elvis Presley. The estate has taken more than
twenty-four claims to court regarding publicity licensing rights.1 24
Although the estate has grounds for publicity claims literally from
coast to coast, the executive director of Graceland, Jack Soden, pre-
fers to strategically choose those court battles which challenge only
the most egregious infringements of the entertainer's name and
likeness.125
One of the early cases, Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co.,126
was argued in federal district court in New York shortly after Pres-
ley died27 and well before the Stephano decision. 28 Presley had en-
tered into numerous contracts with his exclusive manager, Colonel
Tom Parker, as early as March 26, 1956, which gave Parker the mer-
chandising rights to Presley's name and likeness.12 9 In January of
1974, Parker, Presley, and a third party formed the corporation, Box-
car Enterprises, Inc., which then acted as the contracting entity for
the licensing of the publicity rights.130 Two days after Presley's
death, Boxcar Enterprises, a plaintiff in this action, granted an exclu-
sive licensing right for all merchandise with Presley's name or like-
ness to Factors Etc., Inc., also a plaintiff in Factors Etc. 131 The two
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Creative Card Company from produc-
ing or selling any merchandise with Presley's name or likeness, spe-
cifically including posters.' 3 2
Because the conclusive issue was whether the assignment of Pres-
ley's publicity rights between Boxcar Enterprises and Factors Etc.
was valid, the court examined whether the inter vivos assignment
124. Hilburn, supra note 5, at 10.
125. Id.
126. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
127. Presley died on Aug. 16, 1977, id. at 280, and the decision of this case was ren-
dered Oct. 12, 1977. Id at 279.
128. See supra notes 106-116 and accompanying text.
129. 444 F. Supp. at 280-281.
130. 1d at 281.
131. Id This three year exclusive licensing contract between Boxcar Enterprises
and Factors Etc., with renewal options, apparently lasted until 1983 when Colonel
Parker agreed to sever all ties with the Presley estate in a settlement brought on by
allegations against Parker contained in a report prepared by a court ordered guardian
for Presley's sole (then minor) heir, Lisa Marie. Hilburn, supra note 5; see also supra
note 123 and accompanying text. The allegations against Parker consisted of a breach
of duty to Presley and the estate stemming from onerous contractual agreements be-
tween Presley and Parker that were still in effect. Id.
132. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
survived Presley's death. In the analysis, the court, with reference to
similar Second Circuit decisions, proclaimed that there is a recog-
nized assignable and descendible proprietary right of publicity in
New York.133
Although there was no cited reference to New York case law sup-
porting such a proclamation, the court made an astute observation
concerning the use of the Prosser analysis134 as to the right of public-
ity. The court reasoned that Prosser's view to the appropriation of
one's name and likeness, as viewed under the right of privacy theory,
is inappropriate because it fails to take into account situations where
the person has already taken financial advantage of his publicity
rights and that this "valuable property has more to do with unfair
competition than it does with the right to be left alone."13 5 Quoting
Zacchini II, the court added:
The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straightforward one
of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose
is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that
would have market value and for which he would normally pay.1 3 6
Following the deduction that the right of publicity is a proprietary
descendible right, the court thoroughly discussed the issues of juris-
diction and venue1 3 7 and granted the injunction against Creative
Card.138
Three years later, the Sixth Circuit, in a particularly acerbic opin-
ion against the Presley interest, denounced the entire idea of a de-
scendible right of publicity and reversed an injunctive order
133. Id. at 282.
134. See supra notes 19-21, 111 and accompanying text.
135. Factors Etc., Inc., 444 F. Supp. at 283. This emphasis on situations where the
individual realized the financial value of his name or likeness during life appears to be
the forebearer of jurisdictions requiring such exploitation during life as a necessary el-
ement for a descendible right of publicity upon death. See supra notes 25, 51, 87-92 and
accompanying text.
136. Factors Etc., Inc., 444 F. Supp. at 283 (quoting Zacchini II, 433 U.S. 562, 576
(1977), quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
137. Factors Etc., Inc., 444 F. Supp. at 286-88. The critical issue here was venue.
Creative Card, an Illinois corporation, argued that they did not meet the minimum
contacts requirement needed to trigger the New York long-arm statute (currently
codified at N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1989)) as construed in
the interpretation of 298 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1983), which allows a suit to be heard in the
venue where the cause of action arose. Factors Etc., Inc., 444 F. Supp. at 286-88. The
court explained that because Creative Card sold approximately $7000 worth of Presley
posters in the first eight months of 1977, minimum contacts were established. Addi-
tionally, because Creative Card maintained a representative in New York, minimum
contacts would probably be established even without the poster sales. Id.
Creative Card argued that the case should have been heard in the Northern District
Court of Illinois. Id. at 288. Based upon the inconsistent decisions between jurisdic-
tions, the defendants probably wished to argue the case in a district that had not ad-
dressed the issue of the right of publicity.
138. Id.
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protecting Presley's likeness. 3 9 Factors Etc., still acting as the exclu-
sive licensing representative, had received an injunction at the dis-
trict court level against the Memphis Development Foundation.140
The nonprofit foundation was planning the construction of a memo-
rial statue in Memphis, Tennessee, featuring Presley's likeness.141 In
order to raise funds for the memorial, the foundation solicited dona-
tions. Those people donating in excess of twenty-five dollars to the
memorial fund received an eight-inch pewter replica of the proposed
memorial statue.142 Factors Etc.'s lower court injunction would have
allowed the memorial to be built, but would have halted the "sale" of
the statuettes. 143
The court recognized that recent cases determined the right of
publicity to be a property right, separate and distinct from the per-
sonal right of privacy, and that such cases found the right to be de-
scendible.144 However, the court pointed out that this was a case of
first impression for the Tennessee courts, the operative substantive
law to be followed by this federal court, and that the Sixth Circuit
would have to base its decision upon, among other things, the "policy
considerations . . . and certain moral presuppositions concerning
death, privacy, inheritability and economic opportunity."145
139. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cer denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980). See also supra notes 3, 4, 11 and accompanying text.
140. Memphis Dev. Found, 616 F.2d at 957. The district court held that Factors
Etc., as assignee of Presley's "right of publicity," did control the exclusive licensing
agreement as to Presley's posthumous publicity rights. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id
143. Id.
144. Id. at 953.
145. Id. The court also addressed practical hypothetical problems that would result
by recognizing a descendible right of publicity. Id at 959. Supposedly insurmountable
issues such as which persons would be entitled to the protection, length of time given
for such protection, and other "judicial line-drawing" considerations were posited. Id.
However, "[tihe parade of horrors conjured by the Sixth Circuit in Memphis Develop-
ment... is unreal." Factors IV, 652 F.2d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissent-
ing), cert denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). Judge Mansfield continued by describing how
these problems are easily resolved and outweighed by the policy of observing the de-
scendible publicity rights.
Although Mansfield's opinion is not controlling in Factors IV, it is an excellent dis-
cussion espousing the policy considerations behind the recognition of the descendible
publicity right. The basic theme of his argument is that publicity rights represent
the fruits of an individual's investment in the commercial development of the
use of his personality.... Where the publicity right is developed through
commercial investment and exploitation of the individual during his lifetime,
it should be treated just the same as any other intangible property right
owned by him and be devisable or descendible at death. Further, the public
policy of providing incentives for individual enterprise and investment of capi-
Having previously discussed the court's view in this case with re-
gard to the potential future value in a celebrity's right of publicity,146
it is now necessary to explore this court's views concerning the jus-
tice of allowing a celebrity's publicity rights to be uncontrollably ex-
ploited. The court stated that:
It seems fairer and more efficient for the commercial, aesthetic, and political
use of the name, memory and image of the famous to be open to all rather
than to be monopolized by a few.... The memory, name and pictures of fa-
mous individuals should be regarded as a common asset to be shared, an eco-
nomic opportunity available in the free market system. 1 4 7
The inference to be drawn from this passage is that the court be-
lieves it is fair, given our "political and economic system,"'148 that
Lisa Marie Presley, Elvis Presley's sole heir, should lose everything
her father built for her, including her home, Graceland,149 in order to
protect unauthorized private vendors in their sale of "everything
from a copy of Elvis' death certificate to bottles of 'Elvis Sweat.' "150
Perhaps the court based its view on the idea that Factors Etc.'s con-
trol of commercialization was unnecessary because this, after all, was
Elvis Presley. "When Presley's name comes into play: 'Everyone
thinks there is no end to the money.' "151
Interestingly, in support of its view, the court espoused the view
that "[clommercialization of... [this virtue of leaving a good name to
one's children] after death in the hands of [the celebrity's] heirs is
contrary to our legal tradition and somehow seems contrary to the
moral presuppositions of our culture."'152 Contradicting itself, the
court seemed to forget that it was Factors Etc. seeking the injunction
against Memphis Development Foundation which was in effect com-
mercializing this virtue "after death" by distributing statuettes of
Presley to the exclusion of his heirs, violating that "moral presuppo-
sitionU of our culture."153
Arguably, Presley's entourage is very involved with the exploita-
tal and energy argues for allowing an individual to pass the fruits of his labors
along to others after his death.
Id.
146. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
147. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
148. Id.
149. Hilburn, supra note 5, at 10. See also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
150. Hilburn, supra note 5, at 10.
151. Id. (quoting Jack Soden, executive director of Graceland).
152. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
153. Id. The Tennessee legislature rejected the Sixth Circuit's reasoning by enact-
ing the Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108
(1988). The Tennessee courts have also expressly disapproved of the descendible right.
See State ex. reL. Elvis Presley Int'l Mem. Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tenn.
App. 1987).
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tion of his name and likeness,154 but often these types of suits are
brought by the heirs to curtail unauthorized or inappropriate usage
of their ascendant's name or likeness. In Hicks v. Casablanca
Records,55 Agatha Christie's sole legatee sought injunctive relief
against the distribution of a motion picture and book that framed the
real-life Christie in a fictional situation which cast her in a false
light.156 The plaintiffs in Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc.'5 7 were trying to
curtail the production and distribution of plastic busts of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s likeness because they considered this to be an "un-
flattering and unfitting" exploitation. 158 Rudolf Valentino's nephew
sued for an injunction and damages from the production of a televi-
sion film fictionalizing the acting legend's life in a demeaning man-
ner.1 59 Tennessee Williams' representative sought an injunction for
the removal of the playwright's name from a Broadway theatre be-
cause the estate would not be able to maintain quality control over
the productions performed there.' 60 Similarly, in testimony in sup-
port of the New York Celebrity Rights Act,16l Everett Field, W.C.
Fields' grandson, displayed a commercialized poster of the great co-
median depicting him in the nude.162 At the same hearing, John
Clark Gable testified that since his "father was the King of
Hollywood-people are capitalizing on his name" by means of
"demeaning posters, greeting cards and T-shirts."163
An excellent example of both the importance of the control of pub-
licity rights and the inconsistency of views between jurisdictions is
the six-year legal battle between Factors Etc. and Pro Arts, Inc. Fac-
154. Hilburn, supra note 5. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. There are
currently approximately 2,700 licensed "Elvis" items and the sales of such souvenirs
were $750,000 in 1988. Id
155. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
156. Id. at 428-29. See also supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
157. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983). See also supra notes 25 and 58 and accompanying
text.
158. 694 F.2d at 683.
159. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1979). See also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
160. Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 104 A.D.2d 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. App
Div. 1984), rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985). See also supra
notes 94-105 and 116 and accompanying text.
161. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 2; see also supra notes 30-32.
162. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 2. See also supra notes 30-32 and accompa-
nying text.
163. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 1-2.
tors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. (Factors 1)164 was originally decided
the day following Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co.165 The dis-
pute in Factors I also centered around the sale of a Presley poster.
On August 19, 1977, three days after Presley's death, Pro Arts pub-
lished a poster featuring a photo of Presley entitled "IN MEMORY"
with the dates "1935-1977" below the photo.16 6 Pro Arts did not no-
tify Factors Etc. of the printing until several days after the poster
was on the market, at which time Factors Etc. informed Pro Arts
that Factors Etc. held the exclusive licensing rights, and that this
poster had been manufactured and distributed without consent.167
However, Pro Arts "beat" Factors Etc. to the courthouse by filing
suit in the Northern District of Ohio,16s Pro Arts' state of incorpora-
tion,16 9 seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed on
the rights of Factors Etc.170 Upon learning of the suit, Factors Etc.
immediately brought suit in the Southern District of New York as a
companion suit to Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co. 171
Pro Arts argued in Factors I that the New York district court
lacked jurisdiction over Pro Arts, that venue was improper, and that
the case should be transferred to the Northern District of Ohio
where the same issue was pending.172 Factors I relied heavily on the
decision in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co. and determined that
jurisdiction and venue were proper on the same grounds.173 Reason-
ing that because there was already a similar claim before the court in
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., and that the sole issue in these
cases, the exclusive ownership of Presley's publicity rights, was only
a small matter in the Ohio dispute, the court also denied venue trans-
164. Factors 1, 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See supra note 25 and accompany-
ing text.
165. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card, Co. was
decided on October 12, 1977, while Factors I was decided on October 13, 1977.
166. Factors 11, 579 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1978). See supra note 25 and accompany-
ing text.
167. Id.
168. 1&
169. Factors I, 444 F. Supp. at 290; see supra note 25.
170. Factors II, 579 F.2d at 217.
171. Factors I, 444 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
172. Id. at 289-90.
173. Id. at 290-91. See also supra note 137 and accompanying text. In Factors I, as
in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., jurisdiction was based upon the New York
long-arm statute, N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989),
which allows jurisdiction over tort causes of action occurring within New York. Fac-
tors 1, 444 F. Supp. at 291.
However, for venue to be properly laid under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (1983), sufficient
minimum contacts must be found to conclude that the cause of action arose within
New York. Factors I, 444 F. Supp. at 291. The court determined that Pro Arts had
sold at least $9000 worth of "Elvis" posters in New York through October 6, 1977,
thereby establishing minimum contacts. Id However, regardless of the sales figures,
Pro Arts did not dispute that they were doing business in New York. Thus, venue was
properly laid under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1983). Factors 1, 444 F. Supp. at 291.
[Vol. 17: 933, 1990] A Descendible Right of Publicity:
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
fer to the Northern District of Ohio.174
Based upon its findings in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co.,
the court awarded Factors Etc. a preliminary injunction against Pro
Arts' sale of the memorial posters as well as any other usage of the
Presley name or likeness.175 This decision was affirmed in Factors II
without any substantial incident except that the opinion conclusively
stated that Factors Etc. would probably prevail on the merits via its
exclusive agreement with Boxcar Enterprises176 because the "right to
exploit the Presley name and likeness . . . [was] exercised during
Presley's life, [and thus had] survived his death."'177
Because the result of Factors I and Factors II was only a prelimi-
nary injunction, the parties came before the district court of New
York once again to decide the ultimate outcome as to Presley's pub-
licity right in this dispute.178 However, by the time of this hearing,
Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.179 had been
decided against the descendible right of publicity in Tennessee as in-
terpreted by a federal court.'8 0 Pro Arts argued that the district
court should follow suit.' 8 ' The court reaffirmed the Second Cir-
cuit's view as to the descendible right of publicity by restating that
"'Factors possesses the exclusive right to print and distribute Elvis
Presley memorabilia, a right which was validly transferred to it from
174. Factors 1, 444 F. Supp. at 291-92; see also supra note 25. The court also made
reference to Zacchint II, 433 U.S. 562 (1977), noting that Ohio courts had recognized a
"right of publicity." The court determined that the same issue before the New York
court would not result in inconsistent holdings. Factors I, 444 F. Supp. at 292. But see
supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. In Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp.
1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd per curiam, 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1985), the district court
of Ohio reached the exact opposite result in applying Zacchini I. Although reversed
on other grounds, Zacchini I was still controlling law promulgated by the Ohio
Supreme court as to whether the right of publicity, existing as a personal right rather
than a property right, thereby extinguished at death. Reeves, 572 F. Supp. at 1235.
175. Factors 1, 444 F. Supp. at 291-92.
176. Factors II, 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978); see supra note 25. See supra notes
130-31 and accompanying text concerning the agreement between Boxcar Enterprises
and Factors Etc.
177. Factors II, 579 F.2d at 222. The court added a footnote stating that the court
did not address the issues as to whether the right would have survived without Pres-
ley's inter vivos exploitation. Id. at 222 n.11. Many courts believed that such exploita-
tion was required based upon Factors II. For resulting ramifications of this
requirement, see supra notes 25, 70, 102 and accompanying text.
178. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., (Factors i), 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); see also supra
note 80.
179. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
180. See supra notes 139-151 and accompanying text.
181. Factors III, 496 F. Supp. at 1094.
Boxcar following Presley's death.' "182 The Factors III court granted
a permanent injunction against Pro Arts as to the posters and any us-
age of Presley's name or likeness. 183
In their appeal to the Second Circuit, Pro Arts finally drove their
case home to Tennessee with a reversal of Factors Etc.'s injunction in
Factors IV 184 Factors IV accepted Factors I, II, and III's determina-
tions as to the appropriate jurisdiction and venue over Pro Arts via
New York's long-arm statute and Pro Arts' minimum contacts, but
questioned why none of the courts had addressed the choice of law
issue.18 5
Presley was domiciled in Tennessee when he died. Also, Boxcar
Enterprises was a Tennessee corporation. In addition, the contrac-
tual license agreement concerning Presley's publicity rights between
Boxcar Enterprises and Factors Etc. was formed under and governed
by Tennessee law. Therefore, the Second Circuit determined that
the dispute should be decided according to Tennessee law.186
At that time, federal interpretation of Tennessee law still recog-
nized no descendible right of publicity. 8 7 Judge Newman of the Sec-
ond Circuit speculated that had he been a Tennessee Supreme Court
justice or a judge on the Sixth Circuit when Memphis Development
Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc. was decided, he probably would have
upheld a descendible right of publicity.188 Although the Second Cir-
cuit noted that federal courts of appeals are not bound to follow deci-
sions rendered in sister circuits, 8 9 Judge Newman stated that the
issue becomes "whether, and under what circumstances, a ruling by a
court of appeals, interpreting the common law of a state within its
circuit, should be regarded as authoritative by the other federal
courts of the nation."'190 The Second Circuit stated that courts of ap-
182. Id. at 1095 (quoting Factors II, 579 F.2d 215, 222) (2d Cir. 1978). The court re-
jected two additional arguments: that Pro Arts owned the copyright to the photo used
in the poster; and that a contract with Factors Etc. authorized Pro Arts to manufacture
and sell the posters. Id. at 1095-1103.
183. Id. at 1104.
184. Factors IV, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). See
also supra note 80.
185. Factors IV, 652 F.2d at 280.
186. Id. at 281. The Factors IV court's analysis was used in Groucho Marx Produc-
tions, Inc., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982), and resulted in a reversal as well. See supra
note 81 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
188. Factors IV, 652 F.2d at 282. In his dissent, Judge Mansfield pointed out that if
the majority of the panel of three judges "would 'probably uphold a descendible right
of publicity, were [they] sitting on the Tennessee Supreme Court' (Maj. Op., p. 282),
and the third [judge] would certainly do so .... we should so hold rather than retreat
behind unsupportable deferential niceties." Id. at 286 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 281 (footnote omitted).
190. Id. at 282. Judge Mansfield, however, offers a perceptive insight to Judge
Newman's statement of the issue: "Here there was no interpretation of any Tennessee
law by the Sixth Circuit, only a declaration of what that court thought would be a
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peals should not create uncertainty in another circuit's jurisdiction by
contradicting another circuit's rulings unless it can be clearly seen
that the other circuit court made an erroneous interpretation of the
law of the state.191 Accordingly, the Second Circuit in Factors IV re-
versed the decision and found for Pro Arts, in deference to the Sixth
Circuit.192
Factors V,193 VI,'94 and VII,195 were a series of roller-coaster deci-
sions for each party. Once Pro Arts had received a judgment revers-
ing the injunction against them, they went back to the district court
of New York in Factors V seeking damages from Factors Etc. for a
wrongful injunction.196 However, Factors Etc. retaliated with a re-
quest for a summary judgment, or at least a stay of judgment, based
upon another Tennessee case which, decided in the interim between
Factors IV and V, had declared that the right of publicity was de-
scendible.197 The district court granted Factors Etc.'s stay, allowing
them to petition the Second Circuit for a rehearing.198
In Factors VI, the Second Circuit appraised the situation based
upon Tennessee's recent case law regarding the descendible right of
publicity in Commerce Union Bank v. Coors,199 and yet another Ten-
nessee decision, Lancaster v. Factors Etc.,200 which was rendered in
the interim between Factors V and VI.201 The Lancaster court ruled
preferable general common law rule for that state." Id. at 284 (Mansfield, J., dissent-
mg) (emphasis in original). The real issue was how much deference does one court of
appeals show another, especially where the
Sixth Circuit's decision [in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc.] in fact in no way depended on existent local law or methods ... [nor]
makes ... [any] effort, as is sometimes done, to determine what other states
the Tennessee courts tend to look to... much less to be guided by analogous
principles of Tennessee law.
Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
191. Factors IV, 652 F.2d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
192. Id. at 283.
193. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) [hereinaf-
ter Factors V], reh'g denied, 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
194. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.) [hereinafter Factors
VI], vacated by, 562 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
195. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinaf-
ter Factors VII].
196. Factors V, 541 F. Supp. at 232.
197. Id. at 232 (citing Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of Cumberland, Inc., 7 Media
L. Rep. 2204 (BNA) (1981)).
198. Factors V, 541 F. Supp. at 234.
199. 7 Media L. Rep. 2204 (BNA) (1981).
200. 9 Media L. Rep. 1109 (BNA) (1982).
201. Factors VI, 701 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1983). Factors IV was decided against Fac-
tors Etc. on June 29, 1981. Factors IV, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
against a descendible right of publicity.202 Although the Second Cir-
cuit explained that Commerce Union Bank and Lancaster should be
viewed equally, the court took notice that Lancaster "may even have
a special pertinence since it involves a claim by [Factors Etc.] ... who
are plaintiffs in the instant litigation with respect to a descendible
right of publicity concerning Elvis Presley."2 03 The Second Circuit
claimed that the two Tennessee decisions "afford . .. no basis for
considering the law of Tennessee to have authoritatively been
changed since" its decision in Factors IV.204
After more than six years of litigation, with enormously vacillating
results due to the lack of national standards for a descendible right of
publicity, the Factors Etc.-Pro Arts dispute was conclusively resolved
in Factors VII.205 The parties returned to the district court of New
York to resolve the issue of damages incurred by Pro Arts as the re-
sult of a wrongful injunction.206 Factors Etc. had posted a bond after
its first preliminary injunction in Factors 1.207 As "damages for
wrongful injunction are limited to the amount of the bond,"208 the
defendant's award was not to exceed the amount of the previously
posted bond of one hundred thousand dollars.209
Although the Presley retinue, despite Factors I through VII, has
had its share of successes, 2 10 every step into the legal realm of a dif-
927 (1982). Commerce Union Bank, recognizing a descendible right of publicity, was
decided on Oct. 2, 1981, Commerce Union Bank, 7 Media L. Rep. at 2204. As a result,
Factors V granted Factors Etc. a judgment stay on May 11, 1982. See supra note 198
and accompanying text.: Lancaster, rejecting a descendible right of publicity, was de-
cided on Nov. 24, 1982. 9 Media L. Rep. at 1109. Factors VI was decided on Jan. 12,
1983. Factors VI, 701 F.2d at 11.
202. Factors VI, 701 F.2d at 12 (citing Lancaster, 9 Media L. Rep. 1109 (BNA)
(1982)).
203. Id
204. Id. (footnote omitted).
205. 562 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
206. Factors Etc. did not contest a summary judgment in Pro Arts' favor due to the
decision in Factors VI. Factors VII, 562 F. Supp. 304, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
207. See supra notes 164-75 and accompanying text. Factors Etc. did claim that Pro
Arts was barred from receiving damages for a wrongful injunction because they had
not contested the discharge of the bond after Factors Etc.'s award of a permanent in-
junction in Factors III. Factors VII, 562 F. Supp. at 306.
208. Id. at 308.
209. Id
210. Another interesting decision is that of Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). The case centered around an Elvis impersonator, Russen,
who had appropriated virtually every nuance of Presley's act, and was performing
from coast to coast under the title, "The Big El Show." Id at 1348-50. Although the
Estate could not enjoin Russen from performing entirely, the suit was successful in se-
verely limiting Russen's use of various paraphernalia and imagery that was recogniza-
bly identified with Presley. Id. at 1381-82. In its evaluation of a preliminary
injunction, the District Court of New Jersey addressed Presley's publicity rights, and
concluded that, although not specifically termed the "right of publicity," the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67
A. 392 (1907), established a proprietary right of publicity. Estate of Presley, 513 F.
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ferent state or jurisdiction is a gamble. Judge Newman's concern for
jurisdictional uncertainty professed in Factors IV211 can only be alle-
viated by a federal statute setting guidelines and conclusively estab-
lishing the elements for a right of publicity claim. As previously
mentioned, eight states have promulgated such statutes.212 Several of
these statutes are examined in section IV.
IV. STATE STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF A DESCENDIBLE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
A. Virginia
Virginia's statute,2 13 a fairly straightforward law, protects both the
living and the dead's name and likeness from being used without
"written consent" in advertising or trade.214 A person wishing to use
the name or likeness of another for such purposes must obtain con-
sent from the protected individual. If such individual is dead, consent
may be obtained from the spouse, any next of kin, or a parent or
guardian if the individual is a minor.215 The statute does not explic-
itly define who has standing to bring suit, but states that "such per-
sons [who did not consent] may maintain a suit in equity" against the
infringing party.216
The party bringing suit may seek both injunctive relief and actual
damages stemming from the infringement. If the plaintiff can prove
a knowing unauthorized appropriation of his name or likeness, he
may also recover punitive damages from the defendant.2 17 Finally,
the statute imposes a statute of limitations in which suit may be
brought which is equal to "twenty years after the death of such
person."218
Supp. at 1354. The district court added that, in light of such decisions as Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Creative Card Co., see supra notes 124-136 and accompanying text, such a prop-
erty right is descendible. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1355 (footnote omitted); see
also, Apigram Publishing Co. v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. C 78-525 (N.D. Ohio July 30,
1980) (common law right of publicity not preempted by § 301 of the U.S. Copyright Act
of 1976).
211. Factors IV, 652 F.2d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
See also supra note 191 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 29. r
213. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1989).
214. Id. § 8.01-40(A).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. § 8.01-40(B).
B. Kentucky
This statute specifically states that Kentucky recognizes that a per-
son's name or likeness has a commercial value and, therefore, is a
property right.21 9 Under Kentucky law there is a distinction drawn
between the personal right of privacy which is extinguished upon
death, and the "right of protection from appropriation from some ele-
ment of an individual's personality for commercial exploitation,
[which] does not terminate at death."220
Curiously, the second paragraph of the section places limits upon a
public figure. This paragraph sets a fifty-year statute of limitations
for claims from the public figure's date of death, and requires written
consent from the executor or administrator for any usage of the
name or likeness of the deceased.221 The statute is unclear as to
whether a nonpublic figure is subject to any of these limitations.
C Texas
Similar to Virginia, the Texas statute222 offers standing to bring
suit to a broad group, but in a much more structured format.223
Listed under the property title of the Texas code, the statute emphat-
ically states that the use of one's "name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness after the death of the individual" is a property right.224
In Texas, the individual need not have exploited his name or likeness
during his lifetime as the statute protects those whose name or like-
ness may "have commercial value after that time."225 The individual
can freely transfer, convey, or assess his property right,226 or the
party in interest may do so after the individual's death.2 27
A person claiming ownership under the statute must be either one
to whom the interest was transferred during the individual's life, or,
in the event of no transfer, the property right vests in the surviving
219. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 1984).
220. Id. § 391.170(1) (emphasis added).
221. Id § 391.170(2).
222. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.001-26.015 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
223. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08, which affords standing to the surviving
spouse or children to bring suit for the misappropriation of the deceased's name or
likeness. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(c) (West 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 839.1-
839.3, which allows "the surviving spouse, personal representatives or a majority of the
adult heirs of a deceased person," whose name or likeness has been misappropriated,
to seek damages. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.2 (West Supp. 1989). The Oklahoma
statute also considers the unauthorized usage of a name or likeness of the living, as
well as the dead, as a misdemeanor. Id § 839.1.
224. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon Supp. 1989). Interestingly, the statute
is for the protection of a deceased's name and likeness and does not affect the publicity
rights of the living. Id. § 26.014.
225. Id § 26.003(2).
226. Id § 26.004(a).
227. Id § 26.004(b).
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spouses or children and grandchildren. The statute also lays out
forced participation percentages based upon the living number of
heirs.228 However, it is the person who owns more than one-half in-
terest that maintains standing to bring suit.229
Interestingly, like any property statute, the Texas Code encourages
recordation as a manner of preserving one's interest in a deceased's
right of publicity. By fulfilling various statutory requirements such
as, "name and date of death of the deceased" 230 and a registration fee
of twenty-five dollars,2 31 the party in standing will thereby have
"prima facie evidence of a valid claim to a property right" 232 should it
be necessary to bring suit for misappropriation. The encouragement
to register is bolstered with a clause which restricts the owner of a
publicity right from exercising that right during the first year follow-
ing the death of the individual unless the owner registers
ownership.2 33
Although the Texas statute is very thorough, there is a danger of
the property right being extinguished one year after death if the de-
ceased did not transfer his publicity right during life and there is no
surviving heir as defined by the statute.234 The statute also only pro-
tects the publicity rights of the deceased for fifty years from the date
of death.235 In addition, explicitly permitted uses by the media exist
in order to protect the constitutionality of the statute.236 Finally,
damages awarded to the party in interest amount to a statutorial
minimum of $2500, with the addition of actual damages if greater
than the statutorial minimum, profits from the unauthorized usages,
punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs. 237
228. Id § 26.005(a), (b).
229. Id. § 26.005(c).
230. 1& § 26.006(b)(1).
231. Id § 26.006(f).
232. Id. § 26.007(a).
233. Id. § 26.008(b).
234. Id § 26.010.
235. Id. § 26.012(d). Unlike Virginia, Kentucky, Florida, Oklahoma and Texas,
which impose a fixed statute of limitations as to the length of time the heirs may bring
suit or control exclusive use, Tennessee's statute, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103 to -
1107 (1988), sets the termination where it can be shown that the owner of the publicity
rights has not exercised them for two years subsequent to ten years following the
death of the individual. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104(2). It appears that this was an
influence from the Presley estate. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
236. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012(a), (b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
237. Id. § 26.013.
D. New York
Currently, New York does not have a statute which protects the
descendible right of publicity. However, there has been a bill before
the New York Senate for the past two years concerning the issue.238
The bill serves as an amendment to the previously enacted Civil
Rights Law which protects the name and the likeness of the living.239
Modeled after the current California publicity statute, section 990 of
the California Civil Code,240 the proposed New York bill defines the
right of publicity as a property right regardless of whether the right
was exploited during life.241 The amendment provides for free trans-
fer and descendibility of the right and also sets a termination date of
fifty years following the death of the individual.242 The party in in-
terest is ambiguously defined as "the legal representative or succes-
sor-in-interest"243 and provides relief in the form of a statutory
minimum of $750, punitive damages if the misappropriation was done
knowingly, as well as attorney's fees and costs.244
As in Texas, the proposed New York bill vigorously encourages
recordation of ownership by requiring such before the successor-in-
interest may recover any damages.245 The registration similarly will
also serve as prima facie evidence of ownership in a suit.246 If the de-
ceased did not affect an inter vivos transfer and there are no surviv-
ing heirs, the right of publicity is extinguished upon death.247
Although the authors of the proposed bill have taken great strides
in preventing any constitutional conflicts, the biggest obstacle in its
ratification has been such concerns.248 The authors implicitly state
that "[t]he use of a name, voice, signature, photograph or visual im-
age in any constitutionally protected form of expression shall not
constitute a use for which consent is required under this section."249
The proposed bill continues to state that the person bringing suit
must prove that the unauthorized use was clearly for commercial
purposes.250 These provisions, along with a separate clause concern-
ing permitted uses by the media,251 have been unsuccessful in allevi-
ating the New York Senate's fears of an unconstitutional amendment
238. S. 5053-A, 1989-1990 Reg. Sess. § 58 (1989) [hereinafter Celebrity Rights Act].
239. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50, 51 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
240. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 21.
241. Celebrity Rights Act, supra note 238, § 58(1).
242. Id.
243. Id. § 58(2).
244. Id.
245. Id. § 58(6).
246. Id. § 58(6)(c).
247. Id. § 58(5).
248. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 2.
249. Celebrity Rights Act, supra note 238, § 58(3)(a).
250. Id. § 58(3)(b).
251. Id. § 58(7).
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to the Civil Rights Law.252 Consequently, New York, the sight of nu-
merous cases and confusion as to the descendible right of publicity,
must continue in the ambiguity of uncertain case law.
E. California
As the California statute25 3 is virtually identical to the bill pro-
posed in New York, which was formulated from the California stat-
ute,254 the discussion regarding California does not merit repetition.
However, the interesting fact about the California statute is that it
was recently tested in a case involving the heirs of John Wayne.
Wayne Enterprises v. The Upstairs Gallery2 5 5 centered around a se-
ries of Andy Warhol silkscreens of the late actor. One of the silk-
screens was viewed at The Upstairs Gallery in Los Angeles, and the
suit resulted.
The issue in Wayne Enterprises was whether the unauthorized
prints of John Wayne were protected by the first amendment. 256 Ev-
idently, in an order dated April 20, 1988, Judge Hintz of the Los An-
geles Superior Court declared that section 990 of the California Civil
Code was per se unconstitutional.25 7 The plaintiff justifiably theo-
rized that declaring the statute as unconstitutional "has implications
[that go] far beyond the Warhol images. By declaring Civil Code
§ 990 unconstitutional, the Order threatens to inflict a serious blow to
the merchandising and entertainment industries, which depend heav-
ily upon recognition and protection of such rights."258
Fortunately, what was perceived as a catastrophic event for the fu-
ture of descendible publicity rights in California was what seems to
be nothing more than an inadvertent error on the part of Judge
Hintz. However, the judge was not at fault. The defendants, in their
summary motion
incorporated their prior papers, [and] they pulled a fast one and... stuck in
the bit about unconstitutionality [sic] that was never addressed in any papers
whatsoever. Now D [defendant] must know the lie but to think that P [plain-
tiff] didn't catch it is crazy. Strike the order, wherever it is, that was signed 4-
252. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 2.
253. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1990).
254. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 22.
255. Wayne Enter. v. The Upstairs Gallery, No. C627183 (L.A. Super. Ct. Sept. 8,
1989) (dismissed with prejudice).
256. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities on a motion for reconsider-
ation at 5-11, Wayne Enter., No. C627183.
257. 1d at 3-4.
258. Id at 4.
20-88 and make D [defendant] draft a new one. 25 9
Although the order was struck,260 the parties settled out of court
and the suit was later dismissed with prejudice.2 61 The issue of the
constitutionality of section 990 remains open.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Many of the cases in the publicity rights area of the law must con-
tend with the inherent conflict between the first and fifth amend-
ments of the Constitution.26 2 In resolving the issue, the courts must
weigh the equity in protecting a decedent's proprietary publicity
rights against the protection of free expression mandated by the first
amendment.263
The seminal decision in this conflict is Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting, C0.264 In the famous case, Zacchini was a circus per-
former whose specialty was being shot out of a cannon. While per-
forming in Ohio, a reporter from the respondent's television station
captured the performance on film after Zacchini had asked him not
to film the act.265 The film of Zacchini's fifteen second performance
was later shown on respondent's news program.266 The Ohio
Supreme Court recognized that the plaintiff had a right of publicity,
but ruled that the respondent's first amendment privilege in the
broadcast of news outweighed the plaintiff's right of publicity.267
However, the United State Supreme Court disagreed. Zacchini did
not ask for an injunction against the respondent; he merely wanted
compensation for the publication of his performance, this being in no
conflict with first amendment rights.2 66 The Court reversed the Ohio
259. Judge Hintz's notes of record on June 9, 1988, Wayne Enter., No. C627183 (em-
phasis in original).
260. Order entered June 14, 1988, Wayne Enter. v. The Upstairs Gallery, No.
C627183 (L.A. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1989) (dismissed with prejudice).
261. Wayne Enter., No. C627183.
262. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(right of publicity exists and is descendible, but does not attach where the subject mat-
ter is of a fictional literary property or motion picture protected by the first amend-
ment); Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (descendible right of publicity exists, and where the defendant has ap-
propriated the decedent's performance, the first amendment does not protect the fo-
rum even if it is a theatrical play), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317, 318 n.2 (2d Cir.
1982) (stating that regardless of the fact that a descendible right of publicity does not
exist in the proper state's law, defendant had a substantial first amendment
argument).
263. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
264. 433 U.S. 562 (1977); see also supra note 121.
265. 433 U.S. at 563-564.
266. Id. at 564.
267. Id. at 565 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (Zacchini 1), 47
Ohio St. 2d 224, 225, 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (1976)).
268. 433 U.S. at 577-78.
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Supreme Court's ruling that denied Zacchini recovery.
269
This case lays the foundation necessary to propose a theory con-
cerning cases where the protection of the first amendment outweighs
injunctive relief in right of publicity cases. The fifth amendment pro-
vides that "private property shall not be taken for public use, without
just compensation."270 Accordingly, when a court must succumb to
first amendment considerations which mandate that the press and
other expressionists have a right to disseminate material which may
infringe upon a proprietary right of publicity, there should be mone-
tary relief for actual damages in the alternative in those states that
recognize it as such. As actual damages are often difficult to deter-
mine in this area, statutory damages such as those in the various ex-
isting state statutes could be imposed.2 71 However, such a statute
would probably have to be nationally implemented.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has thoroughly traced the development and the use
of the publicity rights cause of action. The intent was to demonstrate
the necessity of a federal statute which addresses more specifically a
descendible right of publicity.
This proposition is supported by the inconsistency of jurisdictional
common law and the federal courts' struggles to determine how state
courts will rule if the issue was before them. An additional burden is
placed upon these courts and the parties involved when the dispute
turns on a first amendment issue. "A national rule on the right of
publicity would serve a useful function in resolving the First Amend-
ment and practical economic problems raised by the conflict between
publicity rights and free speech."272
Congress has the power "[t]o promote the... useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 273 "[T]he State's interest
in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the proprietary in-
terest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertain-
ment . . . [and] is closely analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the re-
269. 1&
270. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
271. See supra notes 238, 245, 255 and accompanying text.
272. Gordon & Honig, supra note 29, at 23.
273. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
ward of his endeavors."274 Drawing such a parallel, as seen in Part
IV of this comment, several states have enacted or are working to-
ward such statutes which address the issues. As misappropriation of
celebrities' names and likenesses becomes increasingly more profita-
ble, and given the increasing ability of these spurious vendors to com-
pete on a national and even global level, jurisdictional and venue
questions will continue to plague this field of law with ambiguity un-
less there is federal statutory guidance.
J. STEVEN BINGMAN
274. Zacchini II, 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
